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Unraveling the Secret Behind the 




This statement is in remembrance of the historical and tragic sinking of the British troopship 
HMT Rohna on November 26, 1943 in the Mediterranean Sea off the North Africa coast. 
Those of us who experienced and survived that ordeal, and the hundreds of families who lost 
loved ones, stand together today in commemoration of that loss. The tragic loss of 1015 soldiers 
of more than 2000 aboard the Rohna marked the greatest loss of American military personnel 
at sea during wartime in our history. It also introduced the deadly results made possible by the 
use of radio controlled guided missiles. The weapon released at dusk from a bomber overhead 
crippled the Rohna in its initial blow. The vessel sank within an hour’s time. The success of 
that attack immediately resulted in a cloak of secrecy by the Allied Forces, that, ironically, 
lasted over 50 years. - 1 
 
The universally provided justification for the “cloak of secrecy” that 
kept the story of the Rohna disaster submerged within the depths of the 
United States and British military records is that the Allied governments 
did not want the German military to realize the success of their Henschel 
293, a new and frightening technology that the Allies had yet to perfect.  
The shocking and tragic event occurred while the ship was transporting 
troops to the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II as part of 
Convoy KMF-29.  Only a few writings of the Rohna sinking exist; it is 
absent from most history books and military histories of World War II.  
Writings that do exist consist of a few scattered newspaper and internet 
articles claiming that necessary military censorship was exercised.  
Survivors and veterans who knew of the sinking accept that the general 
public, including the families of those who perished, could not be 
informed of the details of the sinking because the guided missile was “a 
new device and we didn’t want the Germans to know if it was successful 
                                                       
1 "Memorial Service for the Victims Aboard the Hmt Rohna," transcribed 
speech, in Camden County, N.J., The Rohna Disaster WW II Memorial. New Jersey, 
Camden. 27 July 2002, Robert M. Brewer, 
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or not.”2  This explanation is oversimplified and unenlightened, as it is 
founded on false information about the Germans’ knowledge and 
overlooks critical facts about the Rohna sinking and its aftermath.  British 
and American military records, survivor accounts, and the work of a few 
dedicated historians reveal a complex, multiple-causation explanation for 
the preservation of the Rohna secret.  The reason for the fifty-year “cloak 
of secrecy” is a combination of three factors.  The first contributing 
factor is that during the war, the Allies felt it was necessary to keep the 
success of the guided missile a secret from their own civilians, not the 
Germans, to preserve home-front morale.  Secondly, the deplorable 
condition of the ship and the disgraceful behavior of the British Indian 
crew led to a desire to conceal the details of the event even after the 
defeat of Germany and the conclusion of the war.  Finally, due to the 
presence of American soldiers on a British ship, the American and British 
bureaucratic webs caused the event to become lost in government papers.  
Subsequently, the family members of those who died were left painfully 
uncertain about the fate of their loved ones.  The story of the men who 
tragically died on the Rohna and those who survived was left untold, 
unacknowledged and unremembered. 
The standard justification for the secrecy surrounding the Rohna 
is that the British and American Allies did not want the German military 
commanders to know that one of their guided missiles had successfully 
sunk the HMT Rohna during a Luftwafte air attack on Convoy KMF-29.  
This explanation is flawed because it depends on the assumption that the 
Germans were unaware that the bomb had hit and sunk the Rohna, 
causing a significant loss of life.  The author of Forgotten Tragedy: The 
Sinking of Hmt Rohna and professor of History Carlton Jackson directly 
refutes this premise: “The Germans knew the success of the Henschel 
293—it was in all their newspapers—and they wanted its news spread all 
over the world, especially to the US and the UK.” 3  Jackson also 
provides direct evidence from Major Hans Dochtermann, the German 
pilot flying the plane that released the successful Hs 293, who said in an 
interview that the German military knew the missile had successfully 
sunk an Allied ship and was, in fact, unsatisfied that only one missile had 
made contact.4  German planes also returned to the Mediterranean as the 
ship was sinking to photograph the carnage and to strafe struggling 
survivors in the water who were visible in the dark by the light of the 
                                                       
2 William Dobbs interview by Caitlin McHugh, October 11, 2009, audiotape (in 
Caitlin McHugh’s possession). 
3 Carlton Jackson to Caitlin McHugh, e-mail, November 10, 2009 (in Caitlin 
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4 Carlton Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy: The Sinking of Hmt Rohna. (Annapolis: 
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burning ship.  On these strafing missions, which caused additional loss of 
lives, the German military gained further evidence of the terrible blow it 
had dealt the Allies.    
Although the Americans had a missile called Project MX 108 
that was equivalent to the German guided HS 293, it was still in the 
experimental phase and had not been successfully employed in the attack 
on the Rohna in November 1943.5  The knowledge that the Germans had 
a superior weapon, which had killed so many American soldiers and 
British officers, would have distressed the Allied civilian populations and 
GIs in other theaters of the war; it would have been “‘demoralizing’” to 
the war effort and the confidence of the Allied people in their militaries.6  
The reality that the Germans were ahead in military technology was both 
frightening and embarrassing.   
The British and United States military commanders and their 
respective governments feared that if the details of the Rohna sinking 
were made public in 1943, then the war effort would be seriously 
undermined.  As John Fievet remembers, the survivors of the Rohna were 
given strict orders not to talk or write about what had happened: “I was 
told, if you try to write home about the Rohna you’ll be subject to court 
martial, you cannot tell your family what happened to you.”7  When the 
Rohna survivors arrived in the China-Burma-India Theater, the original 
destination of the Rohna and convoy KMF-26, they found that most 
people there had never heard of the Rohna.  This censoring by top 
military officials was so complete that most of the soldiers, officers, and 
military personnel in the China-Burma-India Theater were completely 
unaware that 1015 American men had been lost at sea.  It was as if the 
Rohna had never existed and the men on her had simply disappeared. 
It may be tempting to accept that the wartime censorship 
deliberately cultivated the American public’s ignorance purely for their 
protection benefit and was the only reason that the Rohna sinking was 
concealed.  However this explanation does not account for why the 
information was not immediately divulged when the war was won and 
Germany was defeated.  All that resulted were a few nondescript 
newspaper articles that did not give the name or location of the ship and 
attributed the attack to a German submarine.  The question remains of 
why there was a “marked reluctance”8 to divulge information about the 
                                                       
5 Ibid., 22. 
6 Interview with Carlton Jackson, in: “The Rohna Disaster: WW II’s Secret 
Tragedy,” prod. New York : A & E Television Networks, (History Channel, 
2001). 
7 Michael Walsh, “An Interview with John Fievet,” in Rohna Memories: 
Eyewitness to Tragedy (New York, 2005), 17. 
8 Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy, 146. 
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Rohna to the families, some of whom were only ever told that their sons 
or husbands were missing in action.    
There are several disturbing facts: the Rohna was shockingly 
overloaded and the officers and crew grossly unprepared for the 
dangerous situation encountered; all safety measures available to the GIs 
in an emergency, consisting of lifeboats, life rafts, and life vests, were 
severely inadequate.  According to the Rohna Memorial Association 
Website, created in 1998, the events, which occurred after the Rohna was 
struck by the guided missile “were so shameful that the secrecy continued 
for decades.”9  The despicable condition of the ship and the inept and 
cowardly actions of the crew compose the second factor contributing to 
the secrecy of the Rohna, which continued after the war.  The details of 
the sinking were deliberately concealed so as not to embarrass both the 
British and the United States governments. 
The Rohna was severely overburdened, rendering it susceptible to 
complications following an attack.  The Rohna was originally a civilian 
ship designed to hold 100 people comfortably.  On the fateful transport 
mission in 1943 from Oran, Africa, to India, the HMT Rohna was 
carrying 2193 military personnel and 195 crew members, roughly twenty 
times its capacity. The result of this massive overloading was that the 
men were crowded below deck in appalling conditions.  The ship was 
old, rickety, and rusted, which had deadly consequences when the bomb 
struck.  William Dobbs was a member of the 31st Signal Battalion Core, 
whose men were divided between the Rohna and its sister ship the Rajula.  
While on board the Rajula, William writes in a letter home: “I spent the 
worst 35 days of my life on that ship[;] we were practically starved, went 
on a hunger strike, not enough latrines or washing facilities, sleeping 
quarters, slept on tables, on floors, on barrack bags and any other place a 
body could squeeze.”10  Similar conditions existed on the Rohna.  As a 
result, the tightly packed ship was vulnerable even before leaving the 
harbor.     
Water travel through the Mediterranean Sea in 1943 was as safe 
as walking through a minefield.  The area of the Mediterranean Sea 
between Algeria and Tunisia was called “Suicide Alley” because of 
exposure to air attack from German-occupied France.11  In the month of 
November 1943 alone, the Germans had sunk the Mont Viso, Santa Elena, 
Marnix Van St. Aldegonde, USS Beauty, Nivose, Carlier, HMS Jela, Birchbank, 
and the Empire Dunstan (Dutch, French, British and American Allied 
                                                       
9 The Rohna Survivor Memorial Association, 2000, http://www.rohna.org/, (15 
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10 William Dobbs to Steven Wolf. September 9, 1945 (Personal Collection, 
Scotch Plains, NJ). 
11 Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy, 18. 
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ships) in the Mediterranean with U-boats and air bombings.12  Safely 
exiting the Mediterranean was not the only challenge: “The word was out 
that leaving the Suez Canal was dangerous because of Japanese subs.”13  
In addition to the volatile conditions of the seas entered, the Rohna held 
the most exposed position in the convoy, the second position, called 
“Coffin Corner”.  The ship in “Coffin Corner” was likely to get hit by a 
bomb that was aimed at a ship in the first position.14  The convoy to 
which the Rohna belonged also lacked the adequate air support required 
in case of an enemy air attack.  The ships in the convoy were carrying 
men for the final thrust to defeat Japan.15  Despite the vital importance of 
Convoy KMF-26, composed of twenty-four ships, much of the RAF air 
protection previously positioned in the Mediterranean had been 
transferred to Britain as part of the buildup for Operation Overload in 
preparation for D-Day.16  
In view of these dangerous circumstances, the correspondingly 
lax safety precautions existing aboard the Rohna were even more 
inexcusable.  Prior to the attack, there was a general disorganization and 
lack of communication among the British officers in the convoy.  There 
was not an established commander of the convoy and the British did not 
bother to assign radio code calls to the ships of the convoy.17  The result 
of this blasé attitude was a lack of vital communication between the 
convoy and escort ships during the attack.  In addition, for an unknown 
reason, the Rohna lacked “barrage balloons, devices to entangle invading 
aircraft or their weapons.”18  All twenty-three other ships in the convoy 
had barrage balloons.  This was probably a careless oversight that placed 
the Rohna at an even greater disadvantage and risk. 
There were several lifeboat drills conducted each day on the 
Rohna, but the events that followed the missile demonstrated that these 
“drills” were neither useful nor thorough.  Carlton Jackson concludes 
that the “utter chaos”19 after the missile struck “could have been avoided 
had there been prior exercises in evacuating a stricken ship.”20  During 
the lifeboat drills, the troops were only told in what order to go to the 
top deck and in which area of the deck to wait for a lifeboat: “The men 
were told that the Rohna’s Indian crew would handle lifeboats and rafts.  
                                                       
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Dobbs interview, audiotape. 
14 “The Rohna Disaster: WW II’s Secret Tragedy.” 
15  Ibid. 
16 Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy, 8. 
17  Ibid., 33. 
18  Ibid., 29. 
19 Walsh, “An Interview with John Fievet,” 9. 
20 Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy, 59. 
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No further instruction was given on how to launch them.”21  On the 
contrary, the Indian lascar crew did not know how to operate the 
lifeboats, and therefore when it became necessary to evacuate the ship 
there was no one aboard who knew how to properly work the lifeboats.  
Many of the Rohna survivors’ reports tell of the lascars running around, 
screaming and hacking wildly in their attempts to lower the lifeboats.  
Rohna survivor Fred Panion reports, “The East India crew was of no use 
to us.  They did nothing to help.”22  Far from helping, the Indian crew 
actually hindered the soldiers by taking the usable lifeboats for 
themselves, “row[ing] away and [leaving] the GIs to do the best they 
could.”23  From their actions, it is clear that the crew was never trained 
on how to proceed if emergency evacuation was required.  The British 
officers not only deceived the men into believing that the lascars could 
operate the lifeboats, they placed the lives of the American men in the 
hands of an incompetent crew, which promptly abandoned them, leaving 
the young men to save themselves.  
Fifty years later, when survivor John Fievet criticized the actions 
of the lascar crew in a documentary about the Rohna, the British 
defensively replied, “Well, the Lascar were not regular Navy personnel, 
they were conscripts picked up from anywhere.”24  This is a poor excuse 
for the miserably handled security on the Rohna; when employing the 
lascar on their ships, the British Navy assumed responsibility for their 
proficiency and actions.  The crew of a ship reflects its command, and 
the British command alone was to blame for the lascar’s lack of training 
and the GIs’ ignorance of the lifeboats; it is without question that 
someone on board the Rohna should have been trained to operate the 
lifeboats.  Ironically, the aforementioned trained Navy personnel, the 
British officers who were supposedly in command of the ship, also did 
little to alleviate the panic and restore order on the top deck.  With 
nobody “giving orders”25 and all precedents established by the lifeboat 
drills forgotten, many men were unnecessarily killed in the ensuing chaos.  
As Jackson reasons, many lives may have been saved if the men had 
merely been instructed on ship attack procedures, including proper 
lifeboat drills.26  If equipment had actually been employed during the 
drills, perhaps someone would have noticed that not only was the crew 
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22 Michael Walsh, “Fred Panion:  Rohna Survivor,” in Rohna Memories: 
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24  Ibid., 14. 
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unable to operate the lifeboats but also that the lifeboats themselves were 
nonfunctional.  
The appalling condition of the lifeboats aboard the Rohna was 
one of the most unnecessary factors that contributed to the Rohna 
tragedy.  The cables holding the lifeboats in place as well as “the latches, 
davits, and blocks”27 had become rusted with age, causing them to be 
“impossible to lower.”28  Compounding their immobility, most of the 
lifeboats had been accidentally painted to the sides of the ship while it 
was being spruced up at port in Oran.  The GIs, who were unfamiliar 
with the lowering equipment and became increasingly panicked by their 
inability to release the lifeboats, frequently resorted to cutting the ropes 
of the lifeboats in order to extricate them.  Most of the time this resulted 
in the lifeboats emptying their contents into the sea or falling violently 
from the great height of the tilted ship, killing the men who had already 
jumped into the water.  Sometimes, as the lifeboats were being lowered, 
the rotted and weak ropes holding them broke, dropping the boats thirty 
feet and killing all the men inside, said Robert Brewer: “I don’t remember 
any one of the boats going down orderly.”29   
If by a miraculous chance the GIs were able to lower a boat 
successfully and if they prevented it from capsizing, the GIs found that 
the lifeboats were too decrepit to last in the rough seas.  In one of the 
most shocking evidentiary testimonies regarding the poor condition of 
the lifeboats, survivor Sgt. Ernest H. Horton indicates that he swam to 
what he thought was safety inside a lifeboat until “someone put their foot 
through the [lifeboat] we were in.”30  The lifeboats of the Rohna, which 
“killed hundreds of men”31 in the process of being lowered, saved very 
few lives.  In summary, of the twenty-two lifeboats available to the 2,388 
people aboard the ship, only two of the six successfully-lowered lifeboats 
“worked properly.”32  The fatal fiasco resulting from the defective 
lifeboats could have been rectified if the safety equipment on the ship 
had been maintained. 
There were similar problems with the 101 rubber life rafts 
aboard the Rohna.  The life rafts, like the lifeboats, had adhered to the 
ship from the paintings and were difficult to release.  Survivor John 
                                                       
27 Jackson, Forgotten Tragedy, 66. 
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Canney had observed GIs who were struggling to untie the ropes that 
connected the life rafts to the ship, noticing that “the knots were too old 
and tight to get more than a couple overboard.”33  The life rafts also 
dropped violently into the water when successfully liberated, crushing any 
GIs below who were attempting to flee the ship. 
When the lifeboats and life rafts proved useless, many GIs were 
forced to rely solely on their life vest as a means of survival.  Like all 
other aspects of the Rohna, the life vests were another example of 
inadequate equipment and poor instruction.  While the British military 
was responsible for practically all of the previously mentioned safety 
debacles, the life vests were American-supplied.  The GIs lack of 
understanding of the life vest proved disastrous once the missile struck: 
 
These devices, unlike the Mae West variety, more commonly used, 
which were worn like a jacket around the upper chest, these were more 
like a donut worn belt-high around their waists.  Once inflated by the 
gas cartridge on the belt, the soldiers that had made the mistake of 
jumping into the sea with their gear, created a high center of gravity, 
which forced many of them under water, head first.  Being exhausted, 
they were unable to right themselves and drowned.”34 
  
Lives could have been saved if the GIs were trained in life vest safety.  
Many survivors felt that had they practiced using the life vests in the 
water, much of the confusion and panic over how to use them would 
have been averted.  Others felt that the Mae West life vests would have 
saved many more lives and were angry that they had not been issued the 
best type available.35  
There are significant discrepancies between the British and 
American official reports concerning the sinking of the Rohna.  The 
American records were created from multiple survivor accounts recorded 
during interviews by the War Department as part of boards of inquiry 
into the Rohna sinking.  The final summary GI accounts, in the form of 
AG Files 704 dating May 4, 1944 from the National Archives, make 
striking observations and conclusions.  For instance, the record states 
that during the interviews the survivors “unanimously condemn[ed] the 
conduct of the Indian crew.”36  The record cites the “condition of the 
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ship’s equipment and the conduct of its crew”37 as one of the most 
influential factors that contributed to the loss of life on the ship, ranking 
second only to the fire and damage caused by the actual explosion.  
Other factors that contributed to the great loss of life in the Rohna 
tragedy were the rough seas and the German strafers; indicatively, the 
British equipment and British crew are the only components of the 
disaster, which could have been improved.  Michael Walsh believes that 
these conclusions by the United States government, demonstrated clearly 
in the records, were part of the reason for the heightened secrecy both 
during and after the war.38  The errors of the British, concisely and 
accurately presented in the records, were so glaringly obvious that if the 
information had been made public, the British government would have 
been in an awkward situation, obligated to justify its carelessness and 
defend its military procedures.  If details of the sinking were released, it 
may have resulted in outrage by the family members of those who 
perished on the Rohna and public concern over the reliability of the 
British Allies.  For instance in 1960, a man named Colonel Virden took 
an interest in the Rohna tragedy.  The Pentagon denied him permission to 
write a book about the Rohna, stating that “any writing on the subject 
might possibly be embarrassing to the British government.”39  Once the 
decision was made that military censorship would be necessary to protect 
national morale and preserve confidence in the British Allies, it was 
easier, after the war, to keep these records and all other information 
about the Rohna concealed rather than to contend with the intricate and 
complicated consequences. 
In addition, in event of a public revelation of the Rohna details, 
the United States government would have faced questions about the life 
vests provided for its troops.  Interestingly, the AG Files 704 conclude 
that “[f]aced with the desertion of the Indian crew, the failure of the 
ship’s equipment, the disastrous results of the awkward effort of the 
troops to lower the boats, the growing confusion and impending panic,” 
the troops were forced to depend “only on their lifebelts.”40  Although 
not stated in AG 704, there were further inquiries into the effectiveness 
of the lifebelts: “Almost every subsequent board of inquiry into the Rohna 
tragedy recommended improvements in life belts worn by American 
personnel.”41  Families of the victims would have wanted to know why 
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the problems with the life belts had not been observed sooner and why 
the realization of life belt deficiency was made at the expense of their 
sons and husbands.  In 2009, since the details of the Rohna tragedy have 
been released and awareness has been raised about the condition of the 
life belts, Carmine Langone, nephew of John Langone who died aboard 
the Rohna found it “inexcusable” that the GIs were supplied with 
defective life belts.42  Any problems with the lifebelts should have been 
observed and “rectified” immediately.43 
The British accounts of the lascar, life rafts, lifeboats, and life 
vests in some cases contain half-truths to disguise concerns, while at 
other times appear to be total fabrication.  A report from Lieutenant 
Commander of the ATHERSTONE to the Commander and Chief of the 
Mediterranean Station, blames the explosion of the bomb for 
“render[ing] useless many of the life boats on the port side.”44  This 
statement contains facts that are true but obscures the reality that the 
boats were useless even before the missile struck.  A report from 2nd 
Officer J.E. Wills of the Rohna describes how the troops were 
“unaccustomed to the ship”45 and therefore “became slightly panicky.”  
Slight panic is a blatant understatement when compared to the numerous 
GI descriptions of the chaos and bedlam that occurred on the top deck.  
While the officer acknowledges that the troops were unaccustomed to 
the ship, he does not deem it necessary to provide an explanation.  This 
confidential document raises questions: why were the troops 
unaccustomed to the ship, and who was responsible for familiarizing 
troops with the ship?   Officer Wills also writes that all the life rafts on 
the Rohna were released.46  This outlier description appears to be false 
because most GI reports, containing information regarding the life rafts, 
state that many were unable to be released.  Lt. Commander of the 
ATHERSTONE also falsely indicates that both the crew and officers 
remained on the ship while all GIs were helped off the ship.  The 
Statement of the Third Radio Officer- S.S. “Rohna” contains even more 
absurd testimony directly contradicting the official conclusions recorded 
in the National Archives and numerous survivor testimonies.  The 
Statement articulates that the lascar crew “acted quite calmly” and that 
the American lifebelts were observed to be “superior to any other I have 
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seen.”47 
In addition to an active desire to protect home-front morale and 
hide the negligence of the British officers and crew, bureaucratic 
indifference further contributed to the fifty-year “cloak of secrecy” 
enveloping the Rohna.  Once the Rohna secret was submerged, the 
contradictory documents were scattered between Great Britain and the 
United States.  Because the ship was British and the soldiers were 
American, “incredible intelligence snarls” resulted, and there was no clear 
coordination of record keeping between the two countries.48  The Rohna 
records were handled so poorly that it was often the case that survivors 
could not receive “recognition or recompense”, because no records could 
be produced on the subject.49  The story of a wife’s difficulty in proving 
that her husband, a Rohna survivor, had been injured in “an attack the 
government wouldn’t acknowledge for more than fifty years”50 is an 
illustration of what anyone seeking further information about or 
involvement with the Rohna faced.  She had to file “document upon 
document with government agencies across the country” before finally 
obtaining the Purple Heart for her husband.51   
It was not until the 1967 Freedom of Information Act that the 
United States government was forced to begin divulging secrets about the 
Rohna.  The government did not formally acknowledge the HMT Rohna 
sinking until House Concurrent Resolution 408 in 2000.  There was never 
any formal notification sent by the government to the family members of 
those who perished on the Rohna, many of whom later died without ever 
knowing the details of their loved one’s fate.   
Even now that the cloak has been lifted, the majority of 
Americans have never heard of the Rohna.  Charles Osgood stated the 
problem of the Rohna phenomenon in his 1993 Veteran’s Day broadcast: 
“It’s not that we forgot.  It’s that we never knew.”  The reasons for this 
lack of knowledge are still misunderstand by the small population of 
Americans that do know about the Rohna.  While the Congressional 
Resolution recognized that the secret was inappropriately kept for too 
long, it gives no explanation for why this occurred.  The 1015 men who 
died aboard the Rohna and in the waters of the Mediterranean gave their 
lives for the safety and security of the United States; they deserved more 
from their country.  Their deaths accounted for approximately a third of 
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the total men lost at sea in transportation during World War II; the Rohna 
sinking was the single greatest loss of lives at sea during a war in United 
States history.  The magnitude of this loss will never be appreciated, as 
now the story is too old to be fully valued and respected.  The secret 
should have surfaced soon after the war ended.  Government deficiencies 
and embarrassment should have been discarded and bureaucracy should 
have been more attentive.  Maybe then the families of those who gave 
their lives aboard the Rohna could have obtained closure.  Maybe then the 
survivors could have been honored and those that perished paid tribute 
to and remembered.  Maybe then the HMT Rohna could have taken its 
due place next to the celebrated and observed disasters such as the RMS 
Lusitania in the Atlantic and the USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor and earned 
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